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Inclusion, Exclusion, and the
"New" Economic Inequality
Olatunde C.A. Johnson*
Introduction
Is racial inequality an unwelcome intruder to the new discourse on
economic inequality? The present discourse on economic inequality
emphasizes decades-long trends that have increased economic inequality,
whether as a result of reoccurring features in the structure of capitalist
economies' or more recent changes in institutional, structural, and
economic conditions. 2 Researchers direct us to the rising fortunes of the top
earners and asset holders relative to the rest,3 the declining fortunes of the
middle claSs 4 harmed by stagnating wages,5 and the declining share of
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. This Comment builds on remarks offered at the
Texas Law Review's Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality. I am grateful to
the participants at the Symposium for helpful conversations and insights, most especially to
Joseph Fishkin, William Forbath, Kate Andrias, Cynthia Estlund, Reva Siegel, and Jeremy
Kessler. Thanks also to Emily Harris and Raymond Moss for their excellent research assistance.
1. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 24 figI. 1, 237-42, 260-

65, 292 fig.8.6 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) (providing support for the conclusion that
contemporary levels of inequality in the democratic, industrialized countries of North America
and Europe are rising to rates similar to the Gilded Age period of the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries). As David Grewal has noted, Piketty "seems divided" on whether certain
features of capitalism that produce levels of inequality are necessary rather than contingent:
"[Piketty] sometimes discusses [r > g] as a quasi-natural fact, while at other times he emphasizes
that it obtains only in particular political contexts." David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism,
128 HARV. L. REv. 626, 644 (2014) (reviewing PIKETrY, supra).
2. See generally CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION

AND TECHNOLOGY (2008) (arguing that U.S. investments in education and human capital
development have not kept pace with technological change, thus driving inequality); Anthony P.
Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, How IncreasingCollege Access Is IncreasingInequality, and What to Do
About It, in REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING Low-INCOME STUDENTS SUCCEED IN COLLEGE 71,

182 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (noting "[t]he current fiscal trajectory in higher education
is unsustainable").
3. There are several ways to measure inequality. See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY:
WHAT CAN BE DONE 17-18 & fig.1.1 (2015) (documenting rise in inequality beginning in 1977
as measured by the Gini coefficient, which measures the actual income distribution relative to
perfectly equal distribution); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United
States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 7-8), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2Ol6QJE.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C88H-PMDX] (showing increases in wealth concentration among the top 0.1% since 1979).
4. See Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer, The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States
(Updated with 2012 Preliminary Estimates) (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://eml
.berkeley.edu//-saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ38-RAUJ] (finding that,
between 2009 and 2012, top 1% of incomes grew by 31.4% and the bottom 99% grew only 0.4%).
5. See, e.g., JOSH BIVENS ET AL., ECON. POL'Y INST., RAISING AMERICA'S PAY: WHY IT'S

OUR CENTRAL ECONOMIC POLICY CHALLENGE 5 (2014), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/65287.pdf
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industries (like manufacturing) in the economy.6 This new economic
inequality discourse has preoccupied economists, 7 garnered its own "beat"
in leading publications, 8 led to bestselling books,9 transfixed current
political debates,'o and now (finally) seduced legal academia. The new
economic inequality is salient in part because it is a phenomenon not fully
constrained by race, ethnicity, or geography that risks altering the fortunes
of all "our kids," including those formerly firmly ensconced within the
American dream."

[https://perma.cc/V7FG-ER4N] (showing hourly pay of workers since 1979 have not kept pace
with productivity, and-with the exception of a period in the 1990s-stagnated or declined for
most American workers); David Cooper, A Stagnating Minimum Wage Has Left Low-Wage
Workers Facing a Longer Climb to Reach the Middle Class, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.epi.org/publication/a-stagnating-minimum-wage-has-left-low-wage-workers-facing-a
(noting "today's
[https://perma.cc/W7U6-XBNS]
-longer-climb-to-reach-the-middle-class/
minimum wage is equal to only 35 percent of the average production worker's wage-not far
from its lowest point on record").
6. In a recent book, Professor Robert Putnam tells the story of American inequality through
the lens of the decline of his predominantly white childhood hometown Port Clinton, located in
Ottawa County, Ohio. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRIsIS 30

(2015) (describing changes in Ottawa County, Ohio, where manufacturing fell from 55% of all
jobs in 1965 to 25% in 1995, and where real wages, which were slightly above the national
average in the 1970s, fell to 25% below the national average); id. at 30 (observing that, by 2012,
the average worker in Ottawa County was paid less than their grandfather or grandmother was in
the early 1980s).
7. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, Economists Take Aim at Wealth Inequality, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/business/economy/economists-take-aim-atwealth-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/2M4N-8FQV] (reporting on the increasing attention that
economists have paid to income inequality in recent years).
8. E.g., The Atlantic Business Editors, 17 Things We Learned About Income Inequality in
2014, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/17-things
-we-leamed-about-income-inequality-in-2014/383917/ [https://penna.cc/CZZ3-JDXC].
9. See Sam Tanenhaus, Hey, Big Thinker, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/04/27/fashion/Thomas-Piketty-the-Economist-Behind-Capital-in-the-Twenty-First
-Century-sensation.htmIl?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/E5D2-SED6] (recounting that publishers are
struggling to keep pace with demand for Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century
and that the economist has become an "intellectual sensation").
10. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Why Trump Now?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/opinion/campaign-stops/why-trump-now.html [https://perma
.cc/77YG-CYJ9] (linking income inequality to rising voter anger and populism in 2016
presidential election); David Lauter, Income Inequality Emerges as Key Issue in 2016 Presidential
Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-campaign-income
-20150205-story.html [https://perma.cc/5YUB-MTS6].
11. As Putnam writes in Our Kids:
My hometown was, in the 1950s, a passable embodiment of the American Dream, a
place that offered decent opportunity for all the kids in town, whatever their
background. A half century later, however, life in Port Clinton, Ohio, is a splitscreen American nightmare, a community in which kids from the wrong side of the
tracks that bisect the town can barely imagine the future that awaits the kids from the
right side of the tracks.
PUTNAM, supra note 6, at 1.
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Racial inequality, by contrast, is not new. One might debate the
extent, trend line, and causes of racial inequality, but the fact of racial
inequality (that socioeconomic status differs on the basis of race or
ethnicity) is neither much in contention nor novel. Perhaps for this reason,
the role of racial inequality in this new calculus is uncertain. One may note
that certain racial, ethnic, or gender groups have experienced greater
income and wealth losses from the recession, losses as yet unrecovered.12
Or even that trends that affect many Americans, such as wage stagnation for
lower skilled jobs, declines in unionization, or changes in the relative share
of manufacturing jobs, affect some groups more than others.1 3 But the fact
of racial inequality is a given. Indeed, what is "new" about the present
discourse on American inequality is that it emphasizes changes that affect
us all. As one commentator recently put it pointedly: "[S]tructural inequity
has leapt the racial barrier."' 4
Add to the unremarkable, un-newness of racial inequality that race
may complicate the search for solutions. The proffered solutions to the new
economic inequality are not typically targeted at particular racial or ethnic
groups. Rather, solutions seek to increase the rewards from work for all
(through stronger worker organizations and wage gains),15 alter the general
tax structure,' 6 and increase investments in and the quality of training and
12. See Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic
Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch
[https://perma.cc/DLP5-KRN9]
.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/
(noting that "racial and ethnic wealth gaps in 2013 [were] at or about their highest levels observed
in the 30 years" of available data); Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Less Than Equal: Racial
Disparities in Wealth Accumulation, URB. INST. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.urban.org/
[https://perma.cc/25Y4
research/publication/less-equal-racial-disparities-wealth-accumulation/
-CX2Z] (stating that in 2010 whites on average had two times the income of blacks and Hispanics,
but six times the wealth).
13. See PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF

PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 67 (2013) (recounting the story of transformation of
majority black, urban labor markets in the Northeast and Midwest, such as Detroit, New York
City, and Chicago, noting that "[fjrom 1957 to 1982, Chicago's manufacturing industry, which
had been a primary source of employment for the black community since the Great Migration,
began to shed jobs within the city even as the industry grew nationwide" (footnotes omitted));
Dorian T. Warren, The American Labor Movement in the Age of Obama: The Challenges and
Opportunities of a Racialized PoliticalEconomy, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 847, 851 (2010) (detailing
challenges faced by African-American workers due to decreases in manufacturing-sector jobs and
attendant levels of unionization); Christian E. Weller, The Black and White Labor Gap in
America, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 5, 2011), https://www.americanprogress.org/
[https://perma.cc/
issues/labor/report/2011/07/25/9992/the-black-and-white-labor-gap-in-america/
B9RU-D7PP] (finding that the loss in manufacturing jobs creates a structural obstacle to black
employment).
14. Charles M. Blow, White America's 'Broken Heart,' N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 4, 2016),
[https://
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/opinion/white-americas-broken-heart.html?_r-0
perma.cc/8VZB-EBC9].
15. See BIVENS ET AL., supra note 5, at 65-66 (suggesting policies to raise worker pay
improves labor market participation).
16. See PIKETrY, supra note 1, at 515 (advocating for global tax on wealth).
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credentialing institutions like college and apprenticeship programs. 17 And
momentum on economic inequality seems most vigorously organized
behind movements such as minimum-wage increases and paid sick leave
that eschew a racial lens not just, it seems, for expedience, but because
these remedies urgently address the immediate harm of wage and work
conditions.18 Indeed, even highlighting racial inequality as a distinct
problem does not necessarily require adopting race- or ethnicity-specific
solutions. Many of the interventions needed for everyone in the emerging
economic reality-better education and training, higher wages-may
simply be needed more urgently for historically disadvantaged groups. But
the interventions are not fundamentally different.
Given this account, what does one gain from highlighting racial
One can start by
inequality in contemporary inequality discourse?
acknowledging that sometimes nothing is gained. For reasons of socialmovement solidarity, tactics and strategy, and efficacy of solutions, race is
often not the point. The workers who benefit from recent wage reforms or
affordable housing creation are typically racially and ethnically diverse, and
a majority are women.' 9 The role of racial, ethnic, or gender stratification
may be salient in the condition of these workers and families, but it need
not always be the dimension around which the remedies are organized.
Lawyers and legal academics face a more specific version of this
general problem of joining concerns about racial inequality with economic
inequality. Discrimination-which is the legal frame for understanding the
problem of inequality-is of questionable relevance in dealing with the
racial dimensions of economic inequality. It suffers, according to many

17. See, e.g., GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 2, at 350-51 (proposing investments in financial

aid to make college more attainable); ROBERT I. LERMAN, BROOKINGS INST.: THE HAMILTON
PROJECT, PROPOSAL 7: EXPANDING APPRENTICESHIP OPPORTUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 8

(2014),

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2014/06/19_hamilton-policies

_addressing-poverty/expand-apprenticeshipsunited stateslerman.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RSF
-XZJF] (arguing that "[e]xpanding apprenticeship is a potential game-changer for improving the
lives of millions of Americans").
18. Steven Greenhouse, How to Get Low-Wage Workers Into the Middle Class, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/fifteen-dollars-minimun
-wage/401540/ [https://perma.cc/NS2Y-8ANM] (describing "Fight for 15" successes in raising the
minimum wage in several cities including Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York,
Chicago, and Kansas City, resulting in wage increases for more than eight million workers).
19. See IRENE TUNG ET AL., NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT, THE GROWING MOVEMENT FOR $15, at

4 (2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Growing-Movement-for-15-Dollars.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7XKA-YAUQ] (reporting that women and people of color make up a disproportionate
share of those receiving less than $15 an hour). Female-headed households make up a
disproportionate share of those currently receiving assisted housing, and blacks and Latinos are
also more likely than whites to receive housing assistance. E.g., Who Lives in FederallyAssisted
Housing?, HOUSING SPOTLIGHT, Nov. 2012, at 1, 2-3.
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analysts, from being an inadequate diagnosis of the problem that leads to
racial inequality and thus risks offering no map for new solutions.20
Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath's introduction to this Symposium
sounds in the timbre of some of the tensions. They reveal an often fitful
and fraught relationship between claims of inclusion based on race, gender,
and other grounds and the "democracy of opportunity" tradition.2 1 Joined
during Reconstruction, these two traditions since emerge more often than
not "tragically at odds."22 Inclusion seems to have more of a foothold in
our constitutional understanding and statutory discourse; the constitutionof-opportunity tradition, by contrast, is forgotten. Both traditions suffer. In
earlier work, Fishkin and Forbath have emphasized that the inclusionary
tradition, is incomplete when disconnected from the constitution of
opportunity tradition.2 3 Their aim is to recover the constitution of
opportunity tradition but without its exclusionary baggage-to journey
forward joining inclusion and anti-oligarchy with the constitution of
opportunity tradition. These insights might inform the question of how
civil rights regulatory regimes should now account for the complex reality
of economic inequality. Indeed, what we understand to be the tools,
strategies, and discourse of "civil rights" are already changing, largely in
response to the changing economic order. Stratification within racial and
ethnic groups has made clear that invocation of race cannot serve as
shorthand for exclusion. This recognition of within-group stratification did
not begin in the post-Civil Rights era, but was intensified by civil rights and
other remedies that produced more benefit for those members of the black
community with more socioeconomic status and capital.24 Indeed, the
potential inadequacy of antidiscrimination remedies was understood early
by reformers who quickly sought to use antidiscrimination law to advance

20. See GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 92-94 (2002) (arguing
that focusing on development biases is more promising than on discrimination-based reward
biases); Roland G. Fryer Jr., Racial Inequality in the 21st Century: The Declining Significance of
Discrimination, in 4B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 855, 925-26 (David Card & Orley

Ashenfelter eds., 2011) (urging educational intervention to address the skills gap).
21. Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An
Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94 TEXAS L. REV.
1287, 1289 (2016).
22. JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY

CONSTITUTION

(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
23. Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth & The Constitution of
Opportunity, 38 NOMos (forthcoming 2016) http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid
=2620920 [https://perma.cc/PU79-YMLW].
24. William Julius Wilson documented these changes more than thirty-five years ago in his
classic study. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE

(2d ed. 1980) (providing evidence that due to these changes race has become less determinative of
socioeconomic outcomes of black Americans than class).
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economic progress,25 as well as pursue strategies to address poverty and
promote economic inclusion more directly.26 Lawyers, perhaps even more
than legal commentators, have understood that lawyering must respond to
the confluence of race and class in new ways. They have understood that
modem civil rights legislation alone cannot cure racialized poverty and
economic exclusion. Litigation such as Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority,2 7 Sheff v. O'Neill,28 and Milliken v. Bradley2 9 repreSent attempts
by litigators to use civil rights law and other legal frameworks to address
the joint problems of race and class inclusion increasingly manifest in the
spatial isolation of the minority poor. These litigation efforts stemmed
from concerns about racial and ethnic exclusion but took aim at the
structure of equal opportunity by seeking fair distribution of public goods
(like schools and housing) and sought to create a political, economic, and
geographic reordering beyond the excluded-included binary.
A key focal point today in joining economic inequality with racial
inequality recognizes how place structures inequality. An increasingly rich
literature has made clear that segregation, geography, and spatial
isolation-which are caused and perpetuated by a confluence of race and
class exclusion-help maintain inequality. 30 This increased emphasis on
how neighborhoods might serve as sites for opportunity, inclusion, and
mobility, instead of exclusion, has led to a renewed focus on economic and
racial integration as well as a new set of emerging legal and regulatory
responses. The existence of inequality along a spatial dimension that
includes race, ethnicity, class, and geography shows us the limits of the
formally race-blind opportunity norm.
Institutions like housing and
education that one might posit as advancing mobility or instantiating an
25. See Olatunde Johnson, Leveraging Antidiscrimination, in A NATION OF WIDENING
OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY 211 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R. Bagenstos
eds., 2015) (providing an account of early Title VII reform efforts that focused on textile plants

and factories in the South).
26. See MICHAEL K. HONEY, GOING DowN JERICHO ROAD: THE MEMPHIS STRIKE AND
MARTIN LUTHER KING'S LAST CAMPAIGN 23, 176 (2007) (describing how King's advocacy

extended beyond civil rights to economic justice); President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement
Address at Howard University:
"To Fulfill These Rights" (June 4, 1965),
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp
[https://perma.cc/6PGR-DF7R]
(advocating Great Society programs in addition to
antidiscrimination protections as necessary to address black poverty).
27. 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969). For a history of this first major public housing
desegregation case, see ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF
SEGREGATION, HOUSING AND THE BLACK GHETTO (2006).
28. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (challenging segregation of schools and housing in Hartford,
Connecticut under the state constitution). For a history of the litigation, see SUSAN EATON, THE
CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL (2007), and History of Sheff v.
O'Neill, SHEFF MOVEMENT, http://sheffmovement.org/history-2/
[https://perma.cc/3E4D
-DWBL].
29. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
30. See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
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opportunity norm operated in ways that created differential points of access,
or even compounded patterns of racial and ethnic inequality.
This
Comment explores how legal regimes have begun to respond to patterns of
inequality that are laid bare by differences in mobility and access to
opportunity shaped by space. This framework allows entry into the
problems of differential inequality, meaning regional differences as well as
racial and ethnic patterns of exclusion. This exploration sheds light on the
broader questions implicated by this Symposium. It suggests a danger in
sidelining differences when we frame the problem of, and solutions to,
economic inequality. It also demands that we interrogate whether the
narratives and social ordering system drawn from an imperfect past have
power to propel us forward.
The remainder of this Comment is organized as follows. Part I
provides a brief account of how the framework of spatial and geographic
inequality has become a key way of understanding problems of racial and
ethnic exclusion as well as class-based exclusion. Part II examines the
contemporary legal and regulatory response to this geographical inequity.
This includes prominent litigation to redefine the boundaries between
communities of high and low opportunity as well as emerging localized
efforts by communities that use innovative legal and regulatory tools to
redistribute opportunities in cities with currently segmented opportunities.
At their best, these efforts can be described not simply as liberalist
interventions to gain inclusion into a flawed economic order, but as
gesturing towards remaking that economic order. They can be described as
seeking economic redistribution with deep attention to inclusion of
historically disadvantaged groups. This specific institutional context helps
inform some of the questions that have occupied this Symposium, which
this Comment takes up in Part III. The current spatial dimensions of
inequality remind us that institutions that were the bulwark of creating an
opportunity norm often create mobility for some and exclusion for others.
And, now, many of those institutions seem under strain for all. If this is
true, it should make us skeptical of solutions that lie in recovering past
constitutionalism or even in rebooting postwar or New Deal institutional
arrangements. Rather, it requires those concerned with inequality to
develop new legal and institutional regimes that push both the opportunity
and inclusion norms beyond their current formulations.

1654
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Difference, Persistence, and Place

Two studies written over the past two years implicate neighborhoods
in the transmission of inequality. The first is squarely about race. Patrick
Sharkey's 2014 book highlights the end of racial progress-that AfricanAmericans are ten times as likely to live in poor neighborhoods as young
whites, and that this experience of neighborhood poverty is durable,
persistent, and inhibits intergenerational mobility.3 '
High-poverty
neighborhoods provide residents with poor schools, fewer opportunities for
labor-force participation, and decreased wealth accumulation. 3 2 Lowincome blacks are more likely to live in neighborhoods of high poverty than
low-income whites, contributing, at least since the 1970s, to sharply
differential patterns of intergenerational social mobility between these two
groups.
In part, Patrick Sharkey's work emphasizes what researchers have
known at least since Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton's 1993 book
American Apartheid: poor blacks (and some dark-skinned Latinos who face
similar levels of residential segregation and racial discrimination in
housing) inhabit neighborhoods that provide them less access to the public
and private goods that enable mobility than their white counterparts.3 3
Massey and Denton's key contribution was to place the racial dimension of
urban inequality back on the table and emphasize that public and private
policies of residential segregation and housing discrimination function to
maintain "ghettos." Sharkey's central contribution is to show that these
patterns are not episodic, but multigenerational. Over two generations, 48%
of black families have lived in poor neighborhoods, contrasted with only
7% of white families.3 4 The stickiness of poor neighborhoods for blacks
has limited progress over the last four decades. African-Americans,
according to Sharkey's data, have made little in wealth or income gains
since the 1970s (indeed, much of the progress for "blacks" comes from
black immigrants).
While Sharkey offers a set of solutions centered on
promoting access to low-poverty neighborhoods and providing quality
programming in high-poverty neighborhoods, his account should lead us to
question whether either civil rights remedies (that address segregation and
discrimination) or universalist solutions (that seek broadly dispersed

31. SHARKEY, supra note 13, at 1-7, 166.
32. See id. at 91, 98, 107, 114.
33. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing the role of racial
segregation in creating high-poverty neighborhoods that impede economic mobility for blacks).
34. See SHARKEY, supra note 13, at 40.
35. Id. at 2-4 (explaining black economic progress since the 1970s as attributable in large part
to an influx of relatively successfully black families arriving from the West Indies, Africa, and
other countries).
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economic benefits for low-income people) will do enough to address
durable poverty in urban areas.
The second study is, in some respects, the more hopeful flipside:
examining where intergenerational mobility might happen. The study by
leading economic-inequality researchers (including Raj Chetty and
Emmanuel Saez) finds substantial variation in intergenerational mobility
within the United States. 36 Relative mobility, they find, is lowest for
children in the southeastern portion of the United States and highest in the
mountain western states and the rural Midwest, where levels of mobility are
comparable to the highest mobility countries in the world.37 As the paper
tells us: "The United States is better described as a collection of societies,
some of which are 'lands of opportunity' with high rates of mobility across
generations, and others in which few children escape poverty."38 While the
study cannot provide an ultimate causal answer, it identifies factors that
correlate with intergenerational mobility, which include the level of
residential segregation by race and income, the level of income inequality,
as well as school quality, social capital networks, and family structure.
This latter study implicates residential segregation by income as a
problem in hampering mobility. Other research has shown that even as
levels of racial segregation have declined (modestly and slowly) over the
last four decades, levels of economic segregation are rising. 40 These
increases parallel the trends of wealth concentration and uneven income
gains; the rich are more likely to live apart from the poor now than forty
years ago.4 As one researcher noted in a recent essay: with these increases

in socioeconomic segregation, "[i]t is possible to look [at] the distribution
of population and resources in metropolitan America as a form of what
sociologist Charles Tilly called 'opportunity hoarding.",4 2

36. See Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of
IntergenerationalMobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1553, 1556 (2014) (noting
differences in mobility across regions).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 1554.
39. See id. at 1557-58.
40. See PAUL TAYLOR & RICHARD FRY, PEW RES. CTR., THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL

SEGREGATION BY INCOME 2 (2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/08/Rise-ofResidential-Income-Segregation-2012.2.pdf [https://perna.cc/U9QS-88UX]; Patrick Sharkey,

Rich Neighborhood, Poor Neighborhood: How Segregation Threatens Social Mobility,
5, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility
BROOKINGS (Dec.
-memos/posts/2013/12/04-how-segregation-threatens-mobility [https://perma.cc/YX7Q-NR3H].
41. See SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1970-2009, at 21 (2011), http://www.s4.brown.edu/
us2010/Data/Report/reportl llll.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGZ3-2M2H] ("[S]egregation of families
by income has grown significantly in the last 40 years.").
42. Thomas Sugrue, Diversity, Toleration, and Space in Metropolitan America, CITIES
http://citiespapers.ssrc.org/diversity-toleration-and-space-in
2014),
23,
(July
PAPERS
-metropolitan-america/ [https://perma.cc/B8GV-VUQ3].
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These empirical insights have new relevance for how we understand
the impact of the new economic inequality. Even as researchers identify
national (and global) trends in inequality, data on residential segregation
and regional variation reminds us that spatial difference matters. Racial and
economic residential segregation operates to exclude some groups from
metropolitan prosperity and to create islands of prosperity within poor
places.
II.

Regimes of Remaking Place

One implication for law and regulation of this new emphasis on place
is that economic and racial integration are back on the legal and policy map.
Promoting residential integration has reemerged as a strategic emphasis of
lawyers. The tools for promoting integration draw on the antidiscrimination
regime of fair housing law but with the broader goal of economic inclusion
in opportunity structures and access to public goods. As this Part suggests,
addressing unequal places also will require more nimble and expansive
remedies than those provided by the antidiscrimination regime. One sees
the contours of this in emerging efforts to use state and local regulatory
tools to reconstitute private power and public goods within metropolitan
regions.
A.

Antidiscriminationand Inclusive Communities Project

The recent Supreme Court fair housing case, Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project3 (ICP),
provides an example of litigation in the first category. The case employs
the antidiscrimination apparatus contained in the Fair Housing Act (FHA)
to challenge the placement of housing developments primarily in lowpoverty communities of color." In the Supreme Court, the case drew the
attention of legal academics because it raised the question of whether the
FHA would be interpreted to extend to actions with a disparate impact
standard.4 5 While more than forty years of lower court rulings had
interpreted the Act to prohibit disparate impact discrimination,4 6 the
Supreme Court had never directly addressed this question. In the end, a
majority of the Supreme Court held that the language and history of the

43. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, No. 13-1371, slip op.
(U.S. June 25, 2015).
44. See id. at 1 ("The underlying dispute in this case concerns where housing for low-income
persons should be constructed ... in the inner city or in the suburbs.").
45. E.g., Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate
Analysis of Forty Years of DisparateImpact Claims Under the FairHousing Act, 63 AM. U. L.
REv. 357, 409-11 (2013).
46. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974)
(reading the Fair Housing Act in pari materiawith Title VII to reach effects claims).
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FHA supported disparate impact claims.47 The Court identified racial
integration as a core purpose of the FHA.4 8 As a matter of interpretive
methodology, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority also read the FHA
to achieve coherence with other civil rights statutes, like Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
which the Court had long interpreted to include disparate impact claims.4 9
Even as commentators debate whether some elements of the Court's
decision narrowed the disparate impact standard, the Court's decision left in
place a tool that allows the statute to extend beyond the Court's narrow
constitutional understanding of "discrimination" as requiring proof of
intent. The Court did not emphasize, as in other recent cases, that the Equal
Protection Clause constrains Congress's ability to promote integration or
eradicate bias.so
For those concerned about residential segregation, however, the key
will be what happens next. The ICP litigation is precisely about the
confluence of race and class exclusion implied by Sharkey's and others'
work. In some sense the case is not novel. It is an heir to the public
housing desegregation cases like Gautreaux that challenge the use of public
funds and public-siting decisions to compound race and economic
segregation in cities and effectively exclude low-income blacks from
housing opportunities in lower poverty communities outside the central
city. 5 '

Doctrinally, these cases rely on various components of the FHA,

including its disparate impact prong which has defined disparate impact as
S. Ct. at 23-24.
48. See id. at 24 ("The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the Kerner
Commission's grim prophecy that '[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal."' (alteration in original) (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON
47. ICP, 135

CIvic DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON Civic DISORDERS 1

(1968)).
49. See id. at 7-13 (drawing on the language and purpose of Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act as well as case law interpreting these two provisions).
50. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582 (2009) (relying on constitutional equal
protection standards to resolve when avoiding a disparate impact liability should be a proper basis
for race-conscious action); see id. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joining majority opinion, but
warning that "the war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or
later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how-and on what terms-to make peace
between them").
51. See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 404 F.3d 821, 824 (4th Cir.
2005) (extending the consent decree from a 1995 class action alleging that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development contributed to segregation in Baltimore public housing);
NAACP v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600,622-23 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding New York State officials
liable for housing and school segregation in Yonkers, New York); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth.,
304 F. Supp. 736, 737-39 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (challenging the Chicago Housing Authority's decision
to build public housing only in African-American neighborhoods). Indeed, the Inclusive
Communities Project arose as a mobility remedy out of the successful Dallas desegregation case.
See Walker v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1272, 1276-80 (N.D. Tex. 1989),
rev'd, 912 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing consent decree in 1985 suit against the Dallas
Housing Authority and HUD for discrimination in public housing).
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avoiding the "perpetuation of segregation,"5 2 as well as the statute's
requirement that federal grant recipients affirmatively further fair housing.
The ICP case addresses a less litigated issue within that general framework:
the potential segregating effects of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) program. Today, the LIHTC is the largest source of subsidized
rental housing.54 The claim offered by ICP, and consistent with other
studies, is that in some regions, LIHTC developments are
disproportionately allocated in neighborhoods that are low income and
underresourced." ICP at the Supreme Court, then, is in many senses a first
step. The key question it raises is how the FHA's antidiscrimination
apparatus might be used to promote racial and economic integration within
a metropolitan region.
B.

Regulationfor Inclusion

A second prong of emphasis is on the federal regulatory-rather than
the litigation-front. This regulatory emphasis includes efforts to use
federal spending and programmatic regulation to promote economically and
racially inclusive communities. The most prominent example is the Obama
Administration's 2015 regulation enforcing the statutory requirement that
federal agencies and grantees affirmatively further fair housing (AFFH)."
The AFFH rule, which replaces a prior rule thought to be less effective,
now requires that grantees conduct self-assessments of housing barriers
within their communities and develop strategies with community input to
promote housing inclusion. The AFFH rule emphasizes that fair housing
requires more than elimination of discrimination, such as specific strategies
to address racial and economic segregation and promote housing choice
among historically excluded groups.
In one sense, the AFFH rule seems firmly within the inclusionary,
antidiscrimination tradition: its concern is with promoting access to housing

52. See United States v. Inc. Vill. of Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2012).
54. See Low Income Housing Tax Credit, H.U.D., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/
datasets/lihtc.html [https://perma.cc/4QC6-54CG] (reporting that an average of over 1,450
projects and 110,000 units were placed in service annually between 1995 and 2013).
55. See, e.g., SIMON KAWITZKY ET AL., FAIR HOUS. JUSTICE CTR., CHOICE CONSTRAINED,
SEGREGATION MAINTAINED: USING FEDERAL TAX CREDITS TO PROVIDE AFFORDABLE HOUSING

19 (2013), http://www.fairhousingjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/FHJC-LIHTCREPORT
-Augl3-Fullvl-7-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA8U-PSEX] (finding that in New York City,
LIHTC units were developed primarily in areas of high or extreme poverty). But see Keren M.

Horn & Katherine M. O'Regan, The Low Income Housing Tax Credit and Racial Segregation, 21
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 443, 454-57 (2011) (finding that use of LIHTC in Massachusetts and
Delaware was correlated with declines in segregation at the metropolitan level).
56. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015)
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576) (final rule).

57. Id.
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opportunity for traditionally excluded groups. But the implications of the
AFFH rule inevitably extend to the economic arrangements of metropolitan
areas. At stake in most communities will be decisions as to where to site
low-income housing, with attendant effects on economic, as well as racial,
segregation. AFFH also has important implications for how one defines the
boundaries between urban and suburban areas, the reification of which have
served as tremendous contributors to current patterns of racial and
economic segregation.5 8 If ICP presents as the opposite of the Court's
cramped constitutional jurisprudence of intent, the AFFH rule is the antiMilliken: a challenge to that case's cramped view of the connections
between housing and other public goods (like schools); the boundaries
between cities, counties, states, and the federal government; and the
meaning of responsibility for sustaining segregation. 59
Federal agencies have also used affirmative grant-making power to
encourage new structural arrangements that diminish racial and economic
segregation. One example is the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's Sustainable Communities grant program. 6 0 The program,
administered in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Transportation
and the Environmental Protection Agency aims to use federal funds to help
redesign communities so that they provide better housing (including
affordable housing), strengthen their infrastructure (including strengthening
public and accessible transportation), and connect communities to jobs, all
in an environmentally sustainable way. 6 1 Grantees engage in community
planning that includes historically marginalized communities, and they
must conduct a Fair Housing and Equity Assessment to promote racial and
economic integration in their communities and to advance fair housing.62
This is not the type of program that could be initiated by an agency
58. See generally Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62
UCLA L. REV. 364, 378-80 (2015) (detailing how historically and legally constructed boundaries
between cities and suburbs frustrated meaningful integration).
59. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974) [hereinafter Millliken 1] (reversing
the district court's interdistrict school integration remedy). For a discussion of Milliken's
shortcomings, including its narrow view of federal court remedial power and its enlargement of
local sovereignty, see Orfield, supra note 58, at 406, 415 (claiming that Milliken I not only distorts
the holding of prior school desegregation cases but erroneously allows notions of local
government sovereignty to limit federal court power to remedy a state's constitutional violation).
60. Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grants, H.U.D., http://portal.hud.gov/

hudportal/HUD?src=/programoffices/economic resilience/sustainablecommunitiesjregional-pl
anning-grants [https://perma.cc/C73V-6JTH].
61. See id. (describing the grant as an effort to coordinate federal programs "to make
neighborhoods more prosperous, allow people to live closer to jobs, save households time and
money, and reduce pollution").
62. See Regional Fair Housing Equity Assessments, H.U.D., http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/HUD?src=/program offices/economicjresilience/regional fairhsgequityassesmt
[https://perma.cc/DY69-HSAZ] (emphasizing that the fair housing assessment tool encourages
housing planning at the regional level with technical assistance from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development).
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dedicated to fair housing enforcement. Instead, it builds on the funding and
programmatic relationship that the agencies have with grantees. HUD's
power to advance fair housing here is not its traditional enforcement power
to resolve complaints. Instead, it derives from the agency's power to issue
grants, provide technical assistance to grantees, convene interested parties
(federal agencies and state, local, and regional governments), and collect
and analyze data. The program is likely insufficiently funded to fully
achieve its goals, but it stands as an example of an effort to use federal
regulatory power and funding to remake the geographical arrangements that
produce opportunity and mobility.
C.

State and Local Regulation and the New SpatialInclusion

Finally are a set of emerging efforts that use innovative forms of
contractual and regulatory power to remake spaces (cities and regions) as
sites for inclusion. An example is the use of community benefits
agreements (CBAs), which are contractual agreements between community
coalitions and an entity (a corporation, institution, or prospective
developer). 63 CBAs are advanced by community groups seeking to
leverage economic expansion to benefit locally affected communities.64
Typically, CBAs address wages, hiring, affordable housing, environmental
standards (including green building, green space, and cleanup), and the
creation of publically accessible institutions such as parks and schools.
Employment conditions and inclusion are among the most consistent
features of these agreements. Many include targeted hiring requirements,
which require hiring and training workers from particular communities or
worker centers.66 Cities, redevelopment agencies, and counties might be
parties to these agreements.

63. For discussions of the history and goals of community benefits agreements (CBAs), see
generally VIRGINIA
AGREEMENTS FOR

PARKS ET AL., THE MOBILITY AGENDA,
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMY

COMMUNITY BENEFITS
4 (2008), http://www

.mobilityagenda.org/home/file.axd?file=2008%2F 12%2FCBApaperfortheintemet.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/6HBR-QES8]; Virginia Parks & Dorian Warren, The Politics and Practiceof Economic
Justice: Community Benefits Agreements as Tactic of the New Accountable Development
Movement, 17 J. COMMUNITY PRAC. 88, 89 (2009); Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Negotiating
for Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current
and Developing Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 113, 114

(2008).
64. See Parks & Warren, supra note 63, at 89 (describing CBAs as part of a larger "new
accountable development movement" that seeks to counter inequitable patterns of growth in urban
economies).
65. See id. at 92 (detailing key components of CBAs).
66. See Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies, PARTNERSHIP FOR
WORKING
FAMILIES,
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/policy-tools-community
-benefits-agreements-and-policies [https://perma.cc/N79D-522W].
67. See, e.g., id. (describing CBAs that establish agreements between developers and local
governments); Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies in Effect,
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Even where community benefits agreements are contracts between
community groups and private developers, municipal governments are often
given the role of enforcing the terms of the agreements.
They are thus
inevitably part of a regulatory project. In addition, an emerging practice of
municipal governments is to require negotiation of a CBA as a condition for
rezoning a parcel of land, providing a tax credit, or awarding a city
contract.69 As an example, Twitter, Inc. and other technology companies
signed a CBA in 2015 in exchange for tax credits when they relocated to
the rapidly gentrifying Tenderloin area of San Francisco.
CBAs leverage place and locality to redistribute economic resources.
They include agreements for housing and employment and typically seek to
benefit residents in the immediate vicinity of the development, such as by
developing pathways for particularly hard-to-employ groups (such as those
with low levels of formal education, the long-term disabled, and those with
prior involvement in the criminal justice system). 7 1 CBAs and first-source
hiring also explicitly include linkages to training and other capacitybuilding organizations.72 In this way, they respond to some of the

PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/page/policy-tools
-community-benefits-agreements-and-policies-effect [https://perma.cc/4FTY-MVYU] [hereinafter
CBAs in Effect] (describing CBAs currently in effect between development agencies and various

cities and counties).
68. See PARKS ET AL., supra note 63, at 5.

69. See, e.g., CBAs in Effect, supra note 67 (describing city and councilmember involvement
in the Oakland Army Base Agreement).
70. The agreements required support for non-profits and local schools, and purchases from
local small businesses. See COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENT 2015-2018, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO CITY ADMINISTRATOR, AND
TWITTER, INC. 8, 10 (2015), http://sfgsa.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentlD=12590
[https://perma.cc/S5E3-M2UR] (listing specific commitments of company to partner with local
for-profit and non-profit organizations); see also COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENTS (2013),
CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR CENT. MKT. & TENDERLOIN AREA, http://sfgov.org/
centralmarketcac/community-benefit-agreements-2013
[https://perma.cc/92E7-MDWU] (listing
CBAs signed in 2013 between the city of San Francisco and six technology companies); Joshua

Sabatini, Mid-Market Tech Companies Reach New Tax-Break Agreements, S.F. EXAMINER
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://archives.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/mid-market-tech-companies-reach
-new-tax-break-community-agreements/Content?oid=2915898
[https://perma.cc/VYV2-CZP2]
(recounting that the CBAs had their origin as part of a tax break established in 2011 to "soften the

impacts of gentrification" while contributing to revitalization).
71. See KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY CBA, COMMUNITY BENEFITS PROGRAM, EXECUTION DRAFT

at

A-9-10

(2013),

http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/pwf/files/documents/Kingsbridge

%20FINAL%20Exhibit%20A%20-%20Community/o20Benefits%2OProgram.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/KE8Z-D422] [hereinafter KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY CBA] (requiring hiring of a particular

percentage of "'Targeted Job Applicants' includ[ing], but not limited to, the Underemployed, the
Unemployed, and individuals from the Targeted Population living in designated areas surrounding

the Project").
72. See PARKS ET AL., supra note 63, at 7 ("CBAs often stipulate that the developer contribute
funds to support existing job training services or create new training services necessary for the
development, to which a range of workers have access."); see also KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY CBA,
supra note 71, at A-9 (requiring that the developer "shall engage the best in class hiring, referral
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limitations of the liberalist framework of the antidiscrimination regime by
expanding the supports that enable workers to succeed. These supports
may include meaningful training, child care, and transportation. CBAs
often avoid exclusive focus on race and ethnicity, yet the large cities in
which CBAs are typically deployed and the local politics undergirding their
adoption has meant that they often benefit a racially and ethnically diverse
population.
CBAs alone cannot provide an answer to the complex problems of
economic exclusion within metropolitan regions. For one, they will work
best for areas that are growing economically: communities that remain
attractive to industry or development. Yet what is novel as a regulatory
approach and framework is the shift from antidiscrimination's rights
framework (often centered on courts) to a framework in which
redistributive demands are made of private power and public goods. The
aspiration of the CBA framework is not simply inclusion in structures of
opportunity presumed to be operating correctly, but the remaking of the
terms of how those structural arrangements distribute opportunity. In that
sense, they are of piece with current social movements centered on raising
the minimum wage or advancing affordable or low-income housing through
inclusionary zoning. At the same time, CBAs are not blind to questions of
differential opportunity: they attend to multiple forms of exclusionavoiding the either/or formulation of race, ethnicity, or gender on the one
hand and economic exclusion on the other.
This recognition of the spatial dimensions of inequality, as well as the
insights offered by the "new" economic equality lead to new legal and
regulatory structures that remake the conception of how those structures
should function in seeking inclusion. The antidiscrimination model cannot
do this alone. The antidiscrimination approach often depends on the
assumption that the institutions of opportunity (housing, schools, job
markets) are essentially functioning well but need to better include
historically disadvantaged groups. The new economic inequality reveals
the fragility of those institutions. The enduring fact of racial and ethnic
inequality has revealed how the success of those institutions often depended
on walling off the poor and racial and ethnic minorities.
III. Reconciling Traditions
This journey into the spatial and racial dimensions of inequality has
implications for the narratives that will now propel us forward. Fishkin and
Forbath seek to recover a constitutional discourse of economic opportunity.
They recognize that this discourse often excluded certain groups-women,
formerly enslaved people, the indigenous, and racial and ethnic minorities.
and training agencies to identify and train qualified employees from the Bronx and New York
City, with a priority to local residents").
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But this is not insurmountable to their project. In their view, the
constitution of opportunity tradition need not depend on this exclusionary
tradition. Rather, it can go forward with the contestations offered by the
This inclusionary tradition began with
constitution of inclusion.
Reconstruction and was realized at least in part by the constitutional and
statutory transformations of the 1960s civil rights era. This invitation must
contend with at least two challenges. First, is the role of constitutionalism,
which presents an obstacle to economic justice claims in court and has not
figured prominently in contemporary social movement efforts. Second, are
the potential limits of recovery discourse, given the inadequacy of past
institutional arrangements.
On the first point, Fishkin and Forbath put their faith in
constitutionalism while the examples discussed in Part II of this Paper are
explicitly statutory and regulatory. Success will depend, then, on whether
(and how) recovery of the constitution of economic opportunity tradition
can counter the Lochnerism that pervades the American constitutional
tradition; its persistence evident in the "neo-Lochnerism" of more recent
Constitutional law in the race or ethnicity
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
and antidiscrimination area has had its own analogue to Lochnerism-a
cramped view of state complicity and state responsibility for remedy that
pervades constitutional opinion. Milliken stands as one example. The
decision takes as fixed what are in fact contingent barriers between city and
suburb, discounting government complicity for residential arrangements
and limiting courts' remedial power.7 4 Indeed, "big-C" constitutionalism's
narrow conceptions of equal protection and remedy guide most modern
civil rights and inclusionary reform efforts away from constitutionalism into
the domain of statutes and regulations. 5 One can, of course, claim these
statutes and regulations as part of a larger constitutional project-a "smallc" constitutionalism that more expansively realizes fundamental
commitments.76 One might also argue that recovering constitutional
meaning is more faithful to history and avoids unnecessarily ceding

73. See Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America, DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS, Winter 2012,
at 46, 51, 55 (discussing "economic libertarianism" of the Lochner Court).
74. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45, 751-53 (1974) (limiting the power of the
district court to order an interdistrict, metropolitan-wide, school desegregation remedy).
75. See Kate Andrias, Building Labor's Constitution, 94 TEXAS L. REV. 1591, 1617-18
(2016) (arguing that modem labor movements often rely on "small-c" constitutional arguments
rather than "big-C" constitutional arguments); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Local Turn:
Innovation and Diffusion in Civil Rights Law, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (forthcoming 2016)
(detailing social movement mobilization to advance legislative and regulatory reform at the

subnational level).
76. See generally WILLIAM

ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: A
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 5-9 (2010) (arguing that certain statutes of great importance have

instantiated norms, rights, and protections more expansive than the formal Constitution, and as
entrenched).
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constitutional ground to economic libertarians. In a world in which history
often informs constitutional
argumentation and even statutory
implementation,n reclaiming a different history may be necessary. The
hope is also that the Constitution deployed beyond clause-bound
interpretation can shape broader narratives that extend beyond courts.
These narratives can then provide the framework for judicial opinions as
well as legislative and public actions. The Constitution may play an
inevitable role in legal interpretation and political discourse, but there are
reasons to be skeptical about encouraging the Constitution to be at the
center of that discourse. In fact, statutes, regulations, and policy reform are
typically the focus of contemporary advocacy in and outside of courts.
Statutory and regulatory measures provide more specific tools -for
addressing complex problems of economic justice and inclusion, and they
provide a potentially responsive site of organization for social movements.
Fishkin and Forbath may be correct that it is important not to cede
constitutional ground to those skeptical of public law's role in advancing
economic justice. But it is equally important not to allow constitutionalism
to occupy the field of possible legal and regulatory interventions.
Second, are the limitations presented by a project of recovering past
traditions-is it worth recovering such a flawed tradition?
Similar
questions are embedded in the current discourse on economic inequality,
which often has hints of nostalgia for a deeply imperfect past. One should
ask whether the past can provide a guide for what inclusion might look like
in the future. This is not simply a rhetorical point about a constitutional
order built on racial and gender inclusion. Recovery also implicates
twentieth-century institutions and structural arrangements. The institutions
that built postwar middle-class prosperity-housing, education, and labor
arrangement-were built on exclusion. The problem of residential racial
segregation reveals the limitations of the New Deal and postwar institutions
that created the mid-twentieth century middle class.
Indeed, the fact of

77. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARv. L. REv. 2109 (2015) (arguing that recent Supreme
Court decisions under the guise of the constitutional avoidance canon articulate new constitutional
norms and rewrite statutes); Bertrall L. Ross II, Against ConstitutionalMainstreaming, 78 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1203 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court often chooses statutory interpretations that
privilege its constitutional values and thus channels statutory interpretation away from
implementing the norms of legislative majorities).
78. New York Times columnist Charles Blow captures this nostalgia well in a recent piece
highlighting "white America's" newfound despair about economic inequality, a reality with which
blacks have long lived. Blow, supra note 14; see also Andrew J. Cherlin, Why Are White Death
Rates Rising?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/opinion/why
-are-white-death-rates-rising.html [https://perma.cc/TU99-L9MU] (linking rising white death rates
to a perception of declining economic prospects in comparison with previous generations).
79. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD

HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005) (examining how
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residential segregation suggests that many of the institutions we credit with
creating opportunity in fact depended on hoarding opportunity. Prosperity
may have depended on stratification; the "good life," on exclusion.
Structuring middle-class space through public and private actions depended
on generating spatial inequality, which endures. If that is the case, as a
matter of both narrative and implementation, the past may provide a limited
guide for the future. The challenge is to develop regulatory and policy
regimes that remedy the failures of the past, while responding to an
evolving economic and racial order.
Conclusion
Highlighting race, ethnic, and gender difference, then, is a necessary
disruption of the current interest in economic inequality. It rightly
challenges both the civil rights and the "opportunity" frameworks. Civil
narratives of integration into functioning institutions are challenged when
those institutions are fraying. Conversely, our best models of economic
opportunity may depend on exclusion.
This demands that equality
frameworks shift away from rights to redistribution while still calling
attention to how difference structures economic arrangements. Whether in
the domain of the Constitution, statutes, or regulations, both frameworks
must now make demands of private power and offer a new conception of
how public goods might be shared.

policies during the 1930s and 1940s significantly disadvantaged African Americans and
connecting those inequalities to de facto segregation and racial inequalities).
80. See generally David Freund, Marketing the Free Market: State Intervention and the
Politics of Prosperity in Metropolitan America, in THE NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY 11 (Kevin M.
Kruse & Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 2006) (providing an account of how federal policies facilitated
the creation of a segregated, two-tiered housing market, yet federal officials advanced notions that
housing arrangements reflected market, not government, choices).

